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by joycelyn stevenson

IS THIS THE BEGINNING OF THE
END FOR TICKETMASTER?

J yci-1L-Y_ S EVNSN
It maintains its dominance primarily through "exclusive
dealing" agreements with such venues, where it also
installs servers and terminals, adding to its apparent
ubiquity.2 In all, the ticketing giant has twenty-four call
centers, 3400 points of distribution, and can claim per-

and went about trying to refine its business model.
Leading the charge was Fred Rosen, who took control of
the company in 1982, 9 and immediately began to
improve the ticket distribution system pioneered by
Ticketron. 1 0 Some of the changes introduced included a

quarter revenues near $60 million for its online units
3
alone.
This Note aims to explore the legal underpinnings of
consumer frustration with Ticketmaster and the rest of

heavier emphasis on concert promotion rather than
sporting events, and a dramatic increase in the $1 service charge that Ticketron had originally charged for its
tickets. 1 1 Ticketmaster executives also invented a profit-

the ticket distribution industry as it moves into the electronic age. First, this Note introduces Ticketmaster and
examines its use of exclusive dealing agreements with
local venues. It then discusses the relevant federal

sharing scheme whereby event venues received a piece of
the service charge, levied against consumers. 12 Critics
likened this scheme to a form of "kickbacks;" supporters
hailed the payments as a form of royalties on an invest-

antitrust statutes affecting the industry and the market
in which distributors operate. It also analyzes the role
exclusive dealing agreements play in stifling competition. Next, this Note discusses the challenges-both
legal and economic-to the industry's most visible mem-

ment. 13 Venues, on the other hand, were almost universally behind Ticketmaster's innovative and creative
As
entry into a previously unutilized market. 14

ber. It then discusses Ticketmaster as a possible product
of competition in light of some of the new competitors
that have entered the marketplace. Finally, this Note
shows Ticketmaster as the aggressor in recent lawsuits
against potential competitors and addresses the competing values of short-term price decreases versus a more
long-term consumer-friendly market. Lastly, it summarizes the challenges facing the ticket distribution industry and recommends possible avenues for a compromise
beneficial to all sides of the debate.

THE BIRTH OF TICKETMASTER
The first major ticket distribution company in the
United States was New York based Ticketron (also
known as Ticket Reservation Systems), which handled
tickets for about one hundred large venues. 4 Ticketron
introduced the option of buying tickets at a local outlet
instead of at the box office. 5 A household name in the
late 1970's, Ticketron soon encountered great difficulties
in the market. 6 When consumers purchased tickets, they
could not be sure exactly where the seats they purchased
were located because they were only allowed to purchase
the "best available seat," instead of purchasing a specific
seat they wanted. 7 In addition, "the best seats often were
available only through the box office," which made it
cumbersome for consumers to retrieve seats to the most
8
popular events via Ticketron.
During Ticketron's prominence, Ticketmaster was virtually unknown. When the former began to falter in the
market, however, Ticketmaster purchased its competitor

Ticketmaster poured millions into developing its distribution system, other companies gradually found them15
selves unable to compete.
The perceptions of Ticketmaster as a monopolistic
entity grew out of the takeover of Ticketron and the
exclusive deals that emerged. Though the United States
Justice Department approved Ticketmaster's request to
purchase Ticketron, some critics insisted the merger was
illegal. 16 With only one major player in the ticket distribution game in the early 1990's, they argued, it was
unlikely that service fees would decrease for many years
to come-a belief that has proven true. 17 Ticketmaster
currently "sells tickets for eighty-five percent of the
largest venues in the United States." 18 The company's
relationship with these venues arose out of exclusive
dealing agreements, whereby a venue agrees to allow
Ticketmaster-and only Ticketmaster-to distribute
tickets to its events. These contracts usually last around
19
five to seven years, depending on the circumstances.
Not only does the company give venues a portion of the
service fees it charges, it also provides venues with
"servers, terminals and other equipment which can be
20
useful in distributing tickets to consumers."
Ticketmaster's fees and exclusive deals with venues
have sparked a debate about the extent to which the ticket distribution industry can be considered competitive. 21

The company's reputation also has sparked a large
amount of litigation, though investigations arising under
federal antitrust law have routinely failed to find proof
behind allegations regarding the company's alleged
monopolistic hold over competition.

m si note
FEDERAL ANTITRUST STATUTES
Anti-competitive claims brought against businesses
have historically arisen under §1 or §222 of the Sherman
Act. 2 3 As one commentator noted, "Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise . .. the freedom guaranteed each and every business is the freedom to compete."2 4 The Supreme Court also announced the purpose
of the Sherman Act in Apex Hosiery v. Leader:
The end sought was the prevention of
restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions, which tended to
restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all
of which had come to be regarded as a special
25
form of public injury.
Price predation has been a part of the antitrust debate
26
for the last twenty years.
The classic example of a
predator is an entity "of
such unequalled size
and financial strength

between two or more entities acting together with a single purpose which negatively affects trade. 3 1 Evidence
must "tend to exclude the possibility that the alleged
' 32
conspirators acted independently.
With whom could Ticketmaster conspire in order to be
in violation of §1 of the Act? Three possibilities exist: (1)
competitors, (2) promoters, or (3) venues. The first two
possibilities are highly unlikely because neither group
stands to gain from Ticketmaster's practices, and both
have been leaders in the fight against the company.
Thus, collusion with the venues seems most likely, due to
the exclusive dealing arrangements through which
Ticketmaster offers software and services in exchange for
the exclusive rights to sell tickets. There has been no evidence, however, that concert venues have in any way conspired with Ticketmaster to cheat consumers.
Moreover, Ticketmaster's actions with respect to venues probably do not run afoul of §1 because the exclusive
dealing arrangements are
not part of a "conspiracy" to restrain trade.
When
Ticketmaster
acquired Ticketron, it

that [could use] a dras-

became the only full-

tic cut in price . . . [to]

service ticket distribu-

eliminate

tion entity in the market, and many venues

competitor

a

smaller
.

.

and

recoup its losses in that
local market. ' 2 7 Any corporation's possible predatory practices should be analyzed
under the Sherman Act, which then necessarily entails
an inquiry into the relevant market for indications of relative market power.
THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "every contract, combination.., or conspiracy in restraint of trade
among the several States is illegal. '2 8 To prevail under a
§1 claim, the plaintiff must prove not only the requisite
concerted action, but also that the conduct resulted in a
restraint of trade. 2 9 There has been rigorous debate as
to how much of a restraint is necessary for a violation.
Clearly, however, §1 does not cover actions by single entities due to the "concerted activities" language in the
statute. Thus, market dominance alone is not enough to
infer that an entity is engaged in monopolistic practices. 30 Rather, violations occur as a result of activity

felt they lacked viable
alternatives at the time
they decided to enter into these agreements. Collusion
and conspiracy to restrain trade were hardly the aims of
the venues, which had a motive to enter the agreements
entirely separate from Ticketmaster's. True, the venues
also were interested in the exclusive agreements because
of the benefits they would receive. But vendors are not
necessarily concerned with whom they have exclusive
agreements or what the other side might hope to achieve;
they simply contract with distributors that give them the
best deal. Therefore, §1 claims simply do not apply in
such a case.
Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
attempted monopolization by a
Supreme Court has defined the
monopolization under §2 as having

prohibits actual and
single entity.3 3 The
offense of unlawful
two elements: "(1) the

possession of monopoly power (i.e., the power to control
prices or exclude competition in a relevant market); and
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(2) an element of deliberateness (i.e., the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior
34
product, business acumen, or historic accident).
Simplified, the two elements can be viewed as an inquiry
into both market dominance and the conduct establishing it. In order to demonstrate attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) a specific intent to
monopolize; (2) predatory or anti-competitive conduct;
and (3) a dangerous probability of success in achieving
35
monopoly power."
Nevertheless, opinions diverge when it comes to decid36
One side of the
ing how and when monopolies form.
debate focuses on the disparity of power between large,
37
This
dominant firms and their smaller competitors.
side argues that the dominant-firm setting lacks the cre38
As one
ative process necessary to drive competition.
commentator notes, "Small firms must endure extreme
degrees of pressure and risk, while the dominant firm
faces only light pressure."3 9 However, another school of
thought believes that "monopolies do not in fact exist
[and that] . . . any high market shares merely embody

efficiency." 40 Dominance accusations are viewed as justi41
fying superior efficiency by the accused.
This "efficiency school" has been successful in blocking
many §2 actions since the middle of the 1970's,42 and
could explain Ticketmaster's continued dominance. The
successes of Ticketmaster may merely stem from business efficiency and the idea that success comes to those
who produce the best product. Based on the test set forth
in §2, it is arguable whether or not Ticketmaster intended to monopolize the concert ticket distribution industry.
Most critics believe that the lack of competition over the
last ten years is a testimony to Ticketmaster's monopoHowever, it is much more likely that
lization.
Ticketmaster offered consumers a better alternative
through improved electronic ticketing access. Viewed this
way, while they do prevent other companies from providing ticket distribution services at certain venues, exclusive dealing agreements are not per se anticompetitive.
Nevertheless, in order to investigate claims of monopolistic action, courts have consistently studied the relevant market in which alleged monopolies operate. Only
through determining the relevant product and geographic markets in which a company operates can courts measure the market power of dominant firms in relation to
smaller competitors, and thus make realistic determinations of monopolistic power.

Relevant Market
"The relevant market is the area of effective competition within which the defendant conducts business." 4 3 This market is usually defined in terms of
products or geographic region. 4 4 A product market
analysis examines possible substitutes for the product
and whether competitors have been excluded from the
market. 4 5 Geographic market analysis, however, looks
at the "area in which the seller operates and to which
the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies or
services." 4 6 It is against both of these markets that
Ticketmaster's power should be assessed.
The Supreme Court articulated the standard for
determining the relevant product market in United
47
There, the
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
court faced the issue of whether, if cellophane and
other wrapping materials were neither fungible nor
priced similarly, the market for other wrappings could
48
be considered distinct from the cellophane market.
The court held that because the facts established that
"cellophane was functionally interchangeable with
other flexible packaging materials, there was no cellophane market separate and distinct from other flexible packaging materials," making it less likely that a
monopoly was at work. 4 9 The Court also took into
account other factors, such as price of services, use,
and quality, in determining if there was a §2 violation. 5 0
Similarly, in International Boxing Club of New
York, Inc. v. United States 5 1 the Supreme Court
determined that "the relevant market was specifically
the promotion of championship boxing rather than all
professional boxing events. ' 5 2 The Court believed
that "non-championship fights are not reasonably
for the same purpose as championship contests and there exists a separate identifi53
able market for championship boxing contests."
interchangeable

More recently the same reasoning was applied in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,
in which the Supreme Court found that "intercollegiate football telecasts constitute a separate market
because they generate an audience uniquely attractive to advertisers," and "competitors are unable to
offer programming that can attract a similar audience." 5 4
Unlike the dichotomy between "championship boxing" and all "professional boxing," the distinctions
between concert tickets, sports tickets, and theater tick-

m Si in te
ets is not clear when debating possible monopolization in
the ticketing industry. Ticket distribution companies primarily compete by soliciting exclusive agreements to distribute all types of tickets for particular venues. Those
who argue that Ticketmaster's product market should be
limited to those exclusive agreements with concert venues do so because this is where Ticketmaster garners
most of its income. 5 5 The premise is that Ticketmaster
has targeted large venues that have products for which
an inelastic demand exists, comprised of people who go to
certain events no matter the cost. In other words, if only
thirty venues can handle the concerts everyone wants to
see, and Ticketmaster has exclusive deals with twentyfive of them, it is effectively closing off the possibility of
competition. This reasoning explains why defining the
precise product market to which Ticketmaster caters is
critical to determine if Ticketmaster has engaged in
monopolistic behavior.
Critics of Ticketmaster have characterized its relevant
market as a small, regional one consisting only of ticketing services to concerts. Ticketmaster, on the other hand,
has pushed for a broader market consideration, given
that it sells tickets to all kinds of events outside of the
concert category. One could argue that the concert ticket
industry is not interchangeable with that for sporting
events and other forms of entertainment, and therefore a
separate, identifiable market exists.
Ticketmaster's
characterization of its product market as a broad one, if
accepted, lessens the likelihood that it would be considered a monopoly. Accordingly, Ticketmaster has argued
that its product market encompasses "all tickets sold for
entertainment events in the
United States. ' 56 Thus,

'5 8

practicably turn for supplies.
The court in American
Football League v. National Football League held that it
is "appropriate to limit the relevant geographic market to
the area which the defendant sought to appropriate to
itself. ' 59 As a result, some argue that Ticketmaster's
geographic market is local because it is on the local level
that Ticketmaster finds competitors trying to break its
exclusive arrangements with venues.
However, one
could also contend that Ticketmaster is a national enterprise that operates throughout the United States.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court stated in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, the geographic market selected
must "both correspond to the commercial realities of the
significant. '6 0
economically
be
and
industry
Ticketmaster's reality is that it serves countless venues
and consumers nationwide. Given the caliber of the services offered by Ticketmaster, it seems unrealistic to label
its geographic market as merely local solely because
competitors have only been able to compete on that level.
The purpose of competition is to have other entities rise
to the level of the industry leader in order to give consumers more efficient and effective alternatives.
Once courts define the relevant market, monopolistic
power must then be proven. 6 1 The Supreme Court has
determined that a party has monopoly power if it has "a
power of controlling price or unreasonably restricting
competition. '6 2 Monopoly power usually involves even
3
It
more than "extraordinary commercial success. ' 6
involves "the use of means which [make] it impossible for
other persons to engage in fair competition."6 4
Nevertheless, the defendant's
market share can be a factor in inferring a monop-

any effect Ticketmaster
has on concert ticketing is

oly. Also, even if a company's market share is less

small when compared to
other events where consumers purchase tickets

than

directly from the venue
itself or even a competitor.
For instance, even if the

entry, courts can still find
a monopoly.
It
has
long been

relevant product market is
characterized as entertainment events held at stadiums,
arenas, and auditoriums, Ticketmaster's market share is
only thirty-seven percent. 5 7
An alternative analysis involves examining a relevant
geographic market. Geographic market is the "area in
which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can

seventy-five

per-

cent, if there are significant barriers to market

argued that exclusive dealing
arrangements are a barrie r to entry because they necessarily prevent competitors from gaining a share of the
market. 6 5 Such agreemen ts allow a venue to maintain a
business relationship with only one particular ticket distributor for the entire perciod set forth in the contract.
But these agreements are a vital feature of the current
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ticket distribution system because they minimize the
66
In
risk of conducting business in uncertain markets.
addition, they reduce transaction costs, as venues and
distributors can avoid needless negotiations of separate
67
contracts for separate ventures.
Still, exclusive dealing agreements remain subject to
antitrust law, and hence must be analyzed under both

the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 68 As a basic matter, selling a product on the condition that the purchaser cannot
purchase or associate with a competing product is not
permitted if the restriction negatively affects competition. 6 9 In United States Healthcare v. Healthsource Inc.,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that "[a]n exclusive arrangement may foreclose so much of the available

m si nte
supply or outlet capacity that existing competitors or new

and Ticketmaster's position therein, what began as criti-

entrants may be limited or excluded . . . [reinforcing]

cism has predictably resulted in formal allegations of

market power and [raising] prices for consumers."

70

When suppliers can only transact with one distributor,
other distributors are foreclosed from transacting with
these specific suppliers. Accordingly, if one distributor
monopolizes the big suppliers in the industry, this exclu71
sive distributor is virtually untouchable.
The Supreme Court first addressed the legality of
exclusive dealing arrangements in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States. 7 2 There, the Court used a "quantitative
substantiality" test to decide the validity of such agreements. The Court found that the effects on commerce
could show the likelihood that the defendant would stifle
Oddly, the Court failed to take into
competition. 73
account the number and strength of other competitors or
barriers to entry in that case. 74 However, the Court did
abstractly analyze the number of competitors and entry
barriers that can arise out of exclusive dealings. 75 This
focus was illustrated when the Supreme Court held:
In evaluating the substantiality of the market
foreclosure in any given case, the court reasoned that it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of
effective competition, taking into account the
strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved and the probable
immediate and future effects which preemption of that share of the market might have on
76
effect competition therein.
Therefore, precedent shows that in deciding the validity of exclusive dealing arrangements, courts will focus
on the relevant market of the accused entity because
anti-competitiveness can only be measured against the
77
Put
specific market in which the entity is competing.
another way, if the entity is not competing in a particular
market, then obviously it is not exerting a monopolistic
hold in that market. Rather, "the relevant market is the
area of competition within which the defendant conducts
business."

78

Defining relevant market becomes even more essential
when formal charges have been filed against a company. 79 This bias is reflected in the belief that "market definition is intended to determine whether competitors
have been foreclosed unreasonably such that other firms
in the same market do not have the ability to keep the
dominant firm from raising prices to supercompetitive
levels."' 80 Given the structure of the ticketing industry

monopolization being brought against the company not
only by consumers, but by artists as well.

TICKETMASTER UNDER
FIRE: ALLEGATIONS OF
MONOPOLIZATION
Despite Ticketmaster's success, charges of monopolistic behavior have been an almost constant cloud over the
company. Sources estimate that "in the post-Ticketron
era, for every dollar of service fee increase passed along
''8 1
to consumers, seventy-five cents goes to Ticketmaster.
Some ticket buyers have argued that Ticketmaster
"squashed any way of getting around service fees" by convincing venues not to open their windows the day shows
go on sale. 8 2 Other criticism has come from concert
artists, the very groups for whom the tickets are sold.
THE PEARL JAM FACTOR
On May 6, 1999, the band Pearl Jam filed a memorandum with the United States Department of Justice alleging that Ticketmaster's business practices amounted to
anti-competitive, monopolistic action in violation of the
Sherman Act. 8 3 Pearl Jam argued that Ticketmaster's
overwhelming share of the ticket distribution market
robbed consumers of free market choice. 8 4 The band also
asserted that the company prevented them from using
other distributors because of its exclusive dealing
arrangements with nearly all of the major venues in the
85
United States.
The dispute began with Pearl Jam's Summer Tour in
1993, when the band requested that Ticketmaster list its
service fee separately on the ticket so that customers
86
would know what the band was actually charging.
Pearl Jam also tried to distribute tickets on their own,
but ultimately failed because their promoter could not
circumvent Ticketmaster's exclusive distribution agreements. 8 7 Unable to compromise privately, on June 30,
1994, Pearl Jam and Ticketmaster representatives testified before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations. 8 8 As a result of the ensuing
debate, Representative John Dingell (D-Mich) proposed a
bill "requiring ticket distributors to disclose the fee they
add to the price of each ticket." 89 The bill eventually
died, but Pearl Jam's resentment of Ticketmaster's operation did not. Years of small, non-Ticketmaster venue
touring were followed by a brief period where the band
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simply ceased playing live concerts entirely. Finally,
Pearl Jam had enough and filed its action with the

CAMPOs v. TICKETMASTER CORPORATION
In Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., a group of con-

Department of Justice.
The D.O.J. investigation centered on the service fee
that Ticketmaster divides among the major venues and
promotion firms and the exclusive contracts with the
venues. 90 In analyzing whether or not Ticketmaster con-

sumers sued Ticketmaster for damages and injunctive
10 0
relief related to anti-competitive business practices.
The complaint alleged a violation of §1 of the Sherman
Act for "engaging in price fixing with various concert ven-

stituted a monopoly by virtue of these practices, the
Department of Justice used §2 of the Sherman Act as its
reference point. 9 1 The Department found that to prove a
violation of §2,92 "the complainant must show that the
firm possess monopoly power in a relevant market and
that it willfully holds that power." 9 3 In addition to market share, some other factors that the D.O.J. analyzed
included: "a decline in market share over time, testimony
that the market was very competitive, a dominant firm's
decision to lower its price in an effort to hold its market
share, a substantial number of competitor's entering the
94
market, and high technology and research costs."
During the proceedings, it did not matter if
Ticketmaster necessarily intended to monopolize the
industry. Commentators have stated, "General intent is
95
Pearl
not an essential element of monopolization."
Jam relied on Lurian Bros. & Co. v. FTC, in which the
Supreme Court held that agreements that on their face
may not stifle competition, could still violate §2 of the
Act. 96 The band claimed that Ticketmaster's dominance
left no alternatives for them to use, causing the band to
subsequently cancel its 1994 summer concert tour-a
detriment to the band and to the consumers wanting to
see them perform. 97 Ultimately, the case boiled down to
a single issue, namely whether Ticketmaster's behavior
was anticompetitive or if the company's rise to dominance in the business was a product of pure competition. 9 8 Pearl Jam suggested, "Ticketmaster acted like a
predator when it reduced its profits in the short term in
order to limit the growth of the alternative ticket distri99

ues and promoters and [for] boycotting the band Pearl
The complaint also added allegations of
Jam." 1 0 1
''monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the market
for ticket distribution services." 10 2 Finally, the plaintiffs
cited a violation of §7 of the Clayton Act for
10 3
Ticketmaster's attempt to acquire its competitors.
The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they were indirect purchasers in the
market.1 0 4 The court reasoned that the venues are the
parties in a direct contractual relationship with
Ticketmaster, not the consumers, and therefore only the
venues would have standing to sue. 10 5 The court lastly
held that the consolidated cases were "improperly
10 6
venued" and thus dismissed the suit.
STANDING
The Supreme Court held in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois 10 7 that "only the direct purchaser from a monopoly supplier could sue for damages under §4 of the
Clayton Act." Additionally, "indirect purchasers generally lack standing under the antitrust laws and so cannot
bring suits for damages." 10 8 Thus, in deciding who has
standing to sue, defining a direct purchaser is important
in the antitrust analysis. Commentators have observed
that "an indirect purchaser is one who bears some portion of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue of an
antecedent transaction between the monopolist and
another independent purchaser . . . [and] such indirect

purchasers may not sue to recover damages for the portion of the overcharge they bear."10 9
The justification for the dichotomy between a direct

bution services."
In the end, the D.O.J. found no wrongdoing on the part
of Ticketmaster. But Ticketmaster's problems did not
end with the D.O.J.'s ruling. A group of consumers subsequently filed an action against the company alleging

and indirect purchaser is that a monopoly overcharge can
injure direct purchasers and those who deal derivatively
with a monopolist. 110 For example, a direct purchaser
could deal directly with a monopolist and in turn pass on
the consequences of this relationship (i.e. increased

price fixing violations and anticompetitive behavior.
Although the case result did not cripple Ticketmaster, it
did mark a pivotal point in the Ticketmaster reign and
also may have exposed Ticketmaster's vulnerable spots

prices) to indirect purchasers (i.e. consumers). Although
the indirect purchaser has still been affected by the
monopolistic power, this is generally considered an example of "incidence analysis." 111 However, if indirect and

to the rest of the world.

direct purchasers both had standing to sue, courts would
have to apportion payment of overcharges between the

m ,sic n te
two types of purchasers. Alternatively, they would have
to allow duplicative recovery-which the Supreme Court
has expressly and continuously rejected.
The consumers in Campos claimed that they were in
fact direct purchasers of "ticket distribution services"
from Ticketmaster, given that Ticketmaster's service fees
112
The Court of
are paid directly to the company.
Appeals, however, found billing practices to be indeterminate of purchaser status, holding that "plaintiffs'
inability to obtain ticket delivery services in a competitive market is simply the consequence of the antecedent
inability of venues to do so." 113 While performers and
entertainers cater to the needs of consumers, the ticket
distribution industry serves the needs of venues.
Moreover, consumers buy the tickets from Ticketmaster
only after the venues have first bought distribution service. Given these facts, the court concluded, "Such derivative dealing is the essence of indirect purchaser status,
and it constitutes a bar under the antitrust laws to the
plaintiffs' suit for damages."1 1 4 Accordingly, the Campos
court dismissed plaintiffs' claims for damages under §4 of
the Clayton Act. 115
But that holding was far from the end of the case.
While consumers cannot sue for damages under §4, "indirect purchaser status does not bar the plaintiffs from
seeking injunctive relief under §16 of the Clayton Act"
because there is no need to trace damages when injunctive relief is sought. 116 Consequently, the court rejected
Ticketmaster's argument that no antitrust plaintiff can
seek injunctive relief unless he also may seek damages.11 7 Instead, the court held that the payment of service fees by plaintiffs established standing to pursue a
claim for injunctive relief and remanded the case based
on this holding.
The Court of Appeals lastly addressed the district
court finding that pursuant to §12 of the Clayton Act,
Ticketmaster was not transacting business in Georgia,
Washington, or Michigan "because it did not exercise 'day

focuses on "whether the parent exercises sufficient control over its subsidiary to cause the parent to transact
business." If the parent company exercises such control,
it is virtually impossible to argue that the parent is not
conducting business in the state where the subsidiary is
located. Of particular importance is the parent company's ability to influence decisions of the subsidiary.
The Campos decision was troubling because it virtually precluded any consumers in the Eighth Circuit from
being able to seek damages from Ticketmaster based on
anticompetitive and monopolistic principles. Relying
heavily on the Illinois Brick indirect purchaser analysis,
the Court of Appeals found that the venues, not the consumers, were within the direct chain of purchasing with
Ticketmaster, and thus the consumer could not be afforded a remedy in this situation.
with
relationship
consumers'
the
However,
Ticketmaster is not necessarily through the venues. The
venue does not purchase the tickets from Ticketmaster to
sell to the consumer; the consumer purchases tickets
directly through Ticketmaster. In fact, consumers may
not even know which venue a particular concert is in
until they buy the tickets. In other words, the venues are
not true middlemen in the direct/indirect purchasers'
sense. Ticketmaster, not the venue, bills the service
charges directly to the consumer. Moreover, since the
venues, under their contract with Ticketmaster, receive a
cut of the service charges on the ticket, they are not
merely "passing along" costs to the final purchaser.
This point highlights another flaw with the decision.
Under the court's reasoning, the venues would have to
bring suit in order to sustain an action for monetary
damages. However, it is highly improbable that a venue
would ever bring suit against Ticketmaster when they
receive software, servers, and portions of huge service
charges from the company. Thus, consumers are completely barred from even being able to argue the right to

to day' control over the operations of its subsidiaries
located in those districts."11 8 The Court of Appeals held
that the district court applied the wrong venue standard
in the case. Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides in

some form of monetary compensation, while the venues
that can sue benefit from not doing so.
On January 19, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
the consumer's petition for a writ of certiorari from the
120
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

part, "any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust
laws against a corporation may be brought not only in
the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also
in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business."1 1 9 When a parent company is brought into a suit
based on the activities of a subsidiary, the court usually

As a result, once again, the merit of whether or not
Ticketmaster exerts a monopolistic stronghold over the
ticket distribution industry remained undecided. Of
course, that the Campos decision is troubling does not
automatically mean that Ticketmaster is a monopoly. It
may be that Ticketmaster is just another company in the
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ticket distribution industry vying for a large share of the
market. Even so, consumers should still have the right
to challenge these practices and have their concerns litigated on the merits.
Given the strict governance of the dichotomy between
indirect and direct purchasers, however, the issue of
Ticketmaster's power may never be litigated. The Justice
Department could still independently investigate the
alleged monopolistic behavior of the company, but even
this possibility seems unlikely. After all, the consumers
who brought the suit against Ticketmaster alleged that
the company's 1991 purchase of Ticketron gave the company a monopoly. 12 1 Even back then, critics had echoed
such concerns given that there were no other real competitors in the industry, and that the acquisition would
allow Ticketmaster to dominate the ticket distribution
industry. But the D.O.J. approved the purchase nonetheless. Given that the Justice Department was aware of
the potential domination of the company when it
approved Ticketron's acquisition, it is unlikely that the
D.O.J. would be moved today to declare the company a
monopoly. But almost nine years after the D.O.J. hearings, it remains necessary to at least discuss whether
competition exists to support the argument that
Ticketmaster's dominance is more a product of the market than a pure monopoly.
Most critics of Ticketmaster argue that the company's
practices meet §2 of the Sherman Act criteria for monopolization or attempted monopolization. They argue that
Ticketmaster has acquired and maintained its power
through deliberate anticompetitive conduct. It may be
more realistic, however, to suggest that Ticketmaster is a
product of the market, not the illegal dominator of it. In
other words, if one looks at the new companies poised to
Ticketmaster, it becomes clear that
challenge
Ticketmaster's rise and ten-year reign on top is a product
of competitive market forces, not necessarily anti-competition.
Inquiries into Ticketmaster's continued domination of
the ticket-distribution industry must also be sensitive to
the critical developments within that industry. Many of
these new changes are due to the Internet. More promoters, and even some venues, are viewing the web as an
untapped channel through which to sell tickets to consumers. 122 Commentators suggest that, "now that ticketing companies are emerging to meet their needs with
different business strategies, competition is back in the
12 3
ticketing industry."

In all, several new and old entities have the potential
to give consumers viable alternatives to Ticketmaster's
alleged monopoly. 12 4 These entities also further advance
the arguments that only in certain conditions will a suit
12 5
In order to
against a dominant firm prove successful.
illustrate Ticketmaster as a mere product of competition,
one must examine some of the potential market threats
to Ticketmaster's dominance, in the wake of allegations
of monopolization.

COMPETITORS
TICKETWEB
TicketWeb proclaims itself as a "proconsumer" company that "exploits the efficiencies of the Web and comput12 6
For the
erized voice-mail to reduce service charges."'
last three years, the company has promoted itself as an
alternative to Ticketmaster, and successfully secured
large-scale events at the Louvre, Wimbledon, and
Premier Parks. 12 7 One year after Pearl Jam went headto-head against Ticketmaster, the CEO of TicketWeb
128
The
decided to "kill service charges using the web."
strategy of the company is to go after "nightclubs, film
festivals, performing arts centers"-virtually any place
where "anti-monopoly sentiment and regional distinctions make it more difficult for Ticketmaster to infiltrate." 12 9 TicketWeb has even ventured to South Africa,
landing a deal with the 30,000-seat Dome in

Johannesburg. 1 30 As a result, the company netted $4.5
million in 1999 ticket sales and is expected to jump to $22
million at the end of 2000.131
But TicketWeb is no longer exactly a competitive
threat to Ticketmaster, which announced on May 30,
2000, that it is acquiring TicketWeb for about $35 million
in stock. 13 2 TicketWeb will keep its website and customers will be able to link to the company's site through
In the end, TicketWeb will
Ticketmaster's webpage.
for smaller-scaled events,
exposure
receive much more
while Ticketmaster increases in dominance in the industry.
TICKETS.COM
In June 1996, a Connecticut-based ticketing software
company, Hill Arts and Entertainment purchased nine
1 33
This
ticketing companies and created "Tickets.com."'
new entity in turn acquired two types of companies: "soft13 4
Like
ware-licensing firms and ticketing distributors."
Ticketmaster, Tickets.com offers venues hardware and
software, and charges high services charges for its tick-

mn
ets. In June of 1999, the company filed to go public, positioning itself as "Ticketmaster's first competitor with any
real muscle."'13 5 The company has a website offering
links to artists and events. If one searches for a particular entertainer, not only will he or she get information on
the artist, but if the company is not handling the shows
personally, the consumer will also get links to brokers
that have the artist's tickets and the ticketers that sell
' 13 6
the tickets-"even if it's the competition."
With the launch of its Virtual Wristband service,
Tickets.com now offers another alternative for consumers. 137 Under the program, consumers who register

for arenas."
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14 4

Big sponsorship typically delivers blocks
of seats to big companies who pay for logo placement. As
a result, average ticket buyers lose out in many of the
best seats.
SFX hopes to become a "vertically integrated" company, with the capability "to produce shows, book tours,
manage and book artists, cut deals on its purchases of
concession goods and other supplies, and lastly sell tickets." 14 5 The company has the potential of being a onestop shopping conglomerate. On February 29, 2000,
Clear Channel Communications Inc. acquired SFX
Entertainment Inc. 146 Through this deal, Clear Channel

for hot ticket events during a window period are assigned
numbers and given seat selections through a lottery system.1 3 8 At present, it is impossible to predict what

will own radio stations, outdoor advertising properties,
and live entertainment venues in more than half of the
top fifty U.S. markets. 1 4 7 Clear Channel, the world's

impact such an innovation will have on the industry, but
it should be recalled that it was only through such types
of innovations that Ticketmaster became the dominant

largest billboard company, also owns 400 radio stations
in one hundred markets in the United States and Puerto

player it is today.
SFX ENTERTAINMENT
SFX is probably in the best position to tackle
Ticketmaster's power. The new concert-business conglomerate "threatens to transform the $1.3 billion livemusic industry."'139 It is the first nationwide concert promoter. Last year, SFX began buying a handful of the
best-run, most powerful independent concert promotion
companies, and it now controls forty-two major concert
venues and more than one hundred clubs and theaters. 1 40 SFX has also purchased several concert sites in
the New England area, furthering rumors that it is set14 1
ting the stage to take over all concert events.
Ticketing is another arena in which SFX is trying to
make a dent. While Ticketmaster has overshadowed
many of the smaller, unfamiliar ticket distributors, SFX
may prove more of an adversary. SFX acquired the company, "Contemporary Group," which operates its own
regional ticketing operation. 14 2 Insiders at SFX have
alluded to plans to directly challenge Ticketmaster's
operation.
Interestingly, SFX is coming under fire in much the
same way as Ticketmaster. SFX has been accused of trying to dominate not only the ticket distribution industry,
but also the concert industry as a whole. Of particular
concern to industry observers is SFX's alignment with
the Marquee Group. 143 The current head of SFX, Robert
Sillerman, is also chairman of Marquee, "a New York
based agency that brokers corporate sponsorship deals

14 8

Rico.
When CEO Sillerman was asked if Ticketmaster
should be worried, he replied that SFX has invested a
large amount of capital development in the ticketing
business.1

49

Sillerman also noted that Ticketmaster has
had the benefit of relatively sparse competition over the
past few years. 1 50 Insiders argue that it will take at
least a year for the savings of SFX to trickle down to the
consumer, if and when it decides to tackle Ticketmaster's
dominance. 1 5 1 But with $1.3 billion spent by consumers
in North America alone on concert tickets in 1999, the
savings may be worth the wait.
OTHER SMALL COMPANIES
There are other smaller companies that have not
reached the level of SFX, but nonetheless remain key to
the debate on the market power of ticket distribution
agencies. One of these companies is BASS Corporation.
BASS is a San Francisco Bay area vendor that handled
the ticketing for Billy Graham Presents. 15 2 In 1986,
BASS was the dominant computerized ticketing service
in Northern California. 153 The company entered into a
licensing agreement with Ticketmaster, which allowed
BASS to use Ticketmaster's computer system and its
name in advertising. 1 54 Ticketmaster also allocated the
15 5
Northern market exclusively to BASS.
Another small company is ETM, the company Pearl
Jam turned to during its battle with Ticketmaster in
1994.156
"ETM builds interactive kiosks in grocery
stores where consumers can buy tickets that carry a fraction of Ticketmaster's service charge." 15 7 The company
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operates in fourteen major markets with exclusive con15 8
tracts with ten major-league sports teams.
Launch.com and CultureFinder.com are two more
web-based companies offering information about artists
as tickets to consumers at lower prices.
Launch.com is a music website offering news about
9
bands, interviews, videos, etc. 15 The company is contemplating selling tickets online to the already popular
base it has established. Similarly, CultureFinder.com is
as well

a website that offers a database of listings for various
events. 160 Plug in the name of an event or city, and
CultureFinder calls the venue and reserves tickets for
the consumer at the box office.

161

THE FUTURE OF TICKETMASTER
The foregoing companies make up the short list of
competitors that have the potential to threaten
Ticketmaster's dominance. Many are in the position
similar to that of Ticketmaster years ago when
Ticketron was on its way out of the distribution game.
The rise of competitors has left Ticketmaster on the

such a motive exists.
Alternatively,
Ticketmaster's efforts could be aimed at trying to preserve its existing legal trademark and sponsorship deals.
proof

of

Given that the exclusive deals Ticketmaster engages in
are perfectly legal, and that new competition is entering
the market, it is less likely that the deep-linking controversy would be construed as sufficient evidence of the
company's monopoly over the ticketing industry.
CONSUMER POLICY
The controversies surrounding the ticket distribution
industry inherently implicate two competing values that
consumers, promoters, venues, and ticketing companies
must tackle-short-term price decreases versus a longterm better market. The short-term/long-term price
dichotomy stems from the service charges that

defensive, not nearly as untouchable as it had been in
the past. Part of this defensive stance is evident in the
increased amount of Ticketmaster-initiated litigation in
the last couple of years.
Recently, Ticketmaster has filed a series of lawsuits
against entities that deep-link to its website. For example, Ticketmaster sued Tickets.com, accusing it of "illegally linking into Ticketmaster's web pages and providing false and misleading ticket price information to the
public." 16 2 On April 28, 1997, Ticketmaster also sued
Microsoft for including a link to the Ticketmaster home
page on Microsoft's Seattle Sidewalk entertainment
site. 1 63 Ticketmaster argues that a company needs a formal license agreement in order to link to its site. The
linking problem ultimately stems from the contracts that
Ticketmaster has with certain advertisers, requiring
them to display certain ads on Ticketmaster's main web
page. When consumers log onto Ticketmaster's website,
they go through several pages of ads before getting to the

Ticketmaster and even some new entities are using.
These service charges can be extremely high, especially
with high-selling tickets. As mentioned, consumers in
the United States have been virtually precluded by the
Supreme Court from receiving relief from these sometimes exorbitant fees. The Department of Justice also
concluded that Ticketmaster's actions do not meet the
stringent test of being monopolistic. Both conclusions
beg the question of what remedy, if any, the consumer has
with respect to the purchasing of tickets.
There is, however, a bigger issue besides the shortterm benefit of lower service charges. Antitrust laws aim
to protect competition and the ability of different types of

ious advertisers.

companies to fill certain needs in the marketplace. When
Ticketmaster bought Ticketron in 1991, there were no
comparable entities in the market to challenge the company's power. However, the Justice Department allowed
the Ticketron acquisition, and subsequent courts have

One could argue that Ticketmaster's attempt to prohibit "deep-linking" onto its site is yet another example of
the company's attempt to monopolize the ticket distribution industry by crippling the competition. However, no

been unwilling to label Ticketmaster a monopoly because
of the importance of a better long-term market. Today,
Ticketmaster is being challenged by entities that are able
to capitalize on Ticketmaster's poor reputation and pick

page where one purchases tickets. When other entities
link directly to the purchasing page, they bypass the
advertisements, violating Ticketmaster's deals with var-

music note
up some of the exclusive deals that are expiring between
Ticketmaster and some larger venues. Also, there are
hundreds of untapped, smaller venues not under contract
with Ticketmaster, that competitors can utilize to gain
market share. Some companies are using these smaller
venues to build up their base so that when exclusive
deals begin to expire with Ticketmaster, they are in a
position to fill the void.
The individuals who are usually overlooked in the
long-term market scenario are the consumers. In theory,
the concert industry and most conglomerates cater to the
needs of the consumers who purchase the music and concert tickets, thereby creating the popularity of many
artists. Concern for consumer welfare was one the factors motivating Pearl Jam's actions back in 1994. But as
those actions have continued to fail, so too does the consumer continue to bear the brunt of the service charges
that many of these ticket distribution companies charge.
As a result, the issue today is not so much whether there
is a monopoly in the ticket distribution industry that
negatively affects consumer choice, but what consumers
and the industry can do in the short-term to lessen any
negative affects of a long-term better market.
The emergence of new players in the ticket distribution industry will not automatically break up the alleged
Ticketmaster monopoly. But they do call into question

rights is-and must remain-a hallmark of
market improvement policy. At the same time,
the pendulum must not be allowed to swing all
the way from letting the buyer beware to letting the seller alone to do so... this would lead
to market replacement substituting for market
improvement. 168

ENCORE! ENCORE!
Over the past decade, the market, the courts, and
increased competition have all provided indications that
Ticketmaster was and is not a monopoly aimed at stifling
competition in the ticket distribution industry. While the
cost to consumers has been relatively high in the wake of
increased service charges and fees, efficiency sometimes
comes at a price.
After acquiring Ticketron,
Ticketmaster became, and still is, the premier ticket distribution outlet for concerts and sporting events in the
United States. This power and dominance has sparked
allegations that the company attempted to monopolize,
and in some instances had held a monopoly on, the ticketing industry due to the decade-long lack of real competition in the industry. This dominance could be explained
partly by the exclusive dealing agreements entered into
with several large venues, making the company the sole
distributor for these venues for five to seven years at a

whether or not Ticketmaster can maintain both its dominance and its consumer relations on equal footing.
Ticketmaster would not be what it is today if consumers
had not availed themselves of its services. The question

time.
Antitrust violations are typically analyzed under §1
and §2 of the Sherman Act. Ticketmaster has not con-

is whether consumers use Ticketmaster because they
have no choice or because of the convenience of

consumers or other competitors out of their share of the
market; therefore, §1 should not apply. Section 2 does

Ticketmaster's service. The answer, clearly, is key in this

cover attempted and actual monopolization of an industry by a single entity, however no proof exists that
Ticketmaster has the predatory conduct necessary to fall

ongoing monopolization debate.
Antitrust law is traditionally viewed in terms of the
black letter law and the Supreme Court's treatment of
the Sherman Act. But recently, another perspective has
evolved that investigates how consumer policy fits into
the antitrust debate. 1 6 4 Some believe that too much protection "fosters too much dependence ... that [in turn]
undermines consumer sovereignty and discourages individual judgment." 1 6 5 The idea is that companies/sellers
1 66
who provide the best service will be amply rewarded.
The marketplace presupposes a semblance of equality of
power between sellers and buyers. 167 Consumers, thus,

spired with competitors, promoters, or venues to cheat

under this rule. Additionally, market realities suggest
that Ticketmaster's relevant market should be viewed as
a broad one, encompassing all entertainment ticketing
instead of mere concert ticket sales on a local level. A
huge part of determining relevant market is determining
in which arena a particular company intended to be
bound. Narrowing Ticketmaster's market to concert ticket distribution unfairly breaks the conglomerate into
marginalized parts solely for the benefit of competitors in

bear some responsibility in how the market treats them.
In the words of one commentator:

local arenas.
In addition, while the exclusive dealing agreements
prevent other competitors from dealing with certain ven-

Unceasing vigilance on behalf of consumer

ues for a period of years, most of these agreements have
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been judged perfectly legal. Considering that many of
these deals were entered into in the early 1990's, it is
now possible for competing companies to fill the void if
they offer a more efficient and effective alternative to
Ticketmaster. SFX Entertainment is a prime example of
an enterprise that is able to introduce a new type of ticket distribution methodology to consumers. SFX not only
distributes tickets, but also promotes and sponsors actual concerts-a "one-stop shopping" approach. Of course,
a big concern is that SFX is almost worse than
Ticketmaster in that a large number of businesses will be
unable to compete with the large-scale events and ticketing devices.
In the end, the consumer ultimately controls the market. If consumers were less willing to pay for events at
any cost, then companies like Ticketmaster and SFX
would not be able to sustain their dominance for so long.
But at least for now, efficiency seems more important to
the consumer than price. Ticketmaster has succeeded
because a consumer can purchase a ticket online, view
where they are sitting, and link to a similar site all at the
Any competitor wanting to displace
same time.
have to provide at least that much to
will
Ticketmaster
attract any substantial number of consumers. After all,
while the Campos decision did not allow consumers to
directly sue Ticketmaster for damages, consumers are
still able to sue for injunctive relief if they choose to do so.
The fact that the plaintiffs in Campus did not pursue
that option is a testament to the apathy many feel in connection with the ticketing industry. Competitors who
have been complaining for the past ten years about
Ticketmaster will also have to be more aggressive and
innovative in their approach to needs in the market.
Ticketmaster was able to takeover Ticketron because of
innovation and increased efficiency in the method of ticket distribution offered to consumers. Since "consumer
friendliness" is the objective, making it easier for consumer to retrieve tickets may be the wave of the future.
Ticketmaster pioneered the most efficient way to purchase tickets; a system allowing consumers to print tick1 Lessley Anderson, Tickets! Please, THE
Oct. 4, 1999, at 3.

INDUSTRY STANDARD.

2 See id. at 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Eric Boehlert, 7Jcketmaster is Under Fire;How David Became
The Industry's Goliath, BILLBOARD. July 9, 1994, at 2.
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ets from home could be the next big move in the industry.
It should come as no surprise then that Ticketmaster,
along with rival Tickets.com, is currently working on providing such a service to consumers.169
A more drastic solution, but perhaps a necessary one,
is to eliminate exclusive dealing agreements from the
ticket distribution industry altogether. Exclusive dealing
agreements, while not illegal, are technically unfair to
those competitors who do not operate their businesses on
such a large-scale. Granted, the venues with which
Ticketmaster has exclusive agreements were not necesAnd to
sarily strong-armed into these agreements.
Ticketmaster's credit, it has generally provided the best
service to consumers, while providing venues service
equipment, terminals, and monetary benefits in
exchange for the ability to be the sole distributor for their
events. Nevertheless, if venues were able to switch companies when they grew dissatisfied with particular distribution services, it would give smaller competitors the
opportunity to get into the ticketing game much sooner.
Venues should be allowed to enter into a contract with a
distributor that works for them, without having to stipulate that it will not hire someone else for several years,
even if they are dissatisfied with the service.
For now, however, the bottom line is that Ticketmaster
continues to dominate because it builds the best mousetrap, so to speak. High service charges are simply a byproduct of marketing efficiency-one that consumers
appear willing, if not always happy, to accept. The emergence of new competitors in the marketplace will test
whether this compromise remains a viable one in the
Just as Ticketron was eliminated by
future.
Ticketmaster in the early 1990's, it is quite possible for
other entities to threaten Ticketmaster's dominance as
well. Ultimately, only time will tell if Ticketmaster's
reign has come to an end and what the future holds for
the entire ticket distribution industry-and for the millions of music, sports, and theater fans it purports to
serve.

6 See id.
7 Id.
8 See id.
9 See id. at 1.
10 See id. at 2. ("Ticketmaster set out to improve [the] system
so that all tickets, drawn from the same computers, would be
availbe at satellite locations as well as the box office. The move
represented a marked improvement for customers.").
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